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Medium 4.7Published Oct 2, 2025

CVE-2025-55971TCL 65C655 Smart TV, running firmware version V8-R75PT01-LF1V269.001116 (Android TV, Kernel 5.4.242+), is vulnerable to a blind, unauthenticated Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability via t…

Updated under an hour ago ()

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It affects tcl 65c655_firmware. Add what you run to find out whether that includes you.

No exploitation reported and no EPSS estimate yet.

TCL 65C655 Smart TV, running firmware version V8-R75PT01-LF1V269.001116 (Android TV, Kernel 5.4.242+), is vulnerable to a blind, unauthenticated Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability via the UPnP MediaRenderer service (AVTransport:1). The device accepts unauthenticated SetAVTransportURI SOAP requests over TCP/16398 and attempts to retrieve externally referenced URIs, including attacker-controlled payloads. The blind SSRF allows for sending requests on behalf of the TV, which can be leveraged to probe for other internal or external services accessible by the device (e.g., 127.0.0.1:16XXX, LAN services, or internet targets), potentially enabling additional exploit chains.

CVSS
4.7 MEDIUM (v3.1, CISA ADP)CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:L
Weakness (CWE)
CWE-918
Known exploited
Not in CISA's KEV catalog
EPSS (exploitation in the next 30 days)
Not loaded for this CVE
Assigned by
mitre
NVD analysis
Analyzed
Record last updated
Oct 3, 2025
First seen by InfoSec Signals
Oct 19, 2026

Affected products

Affected products
tcl 65c655_firmware
tcl:65c655_firmware
v8-r75pt01-lf1v269.001116
NVD

References

  • exploit
  • third-party-advisory

The CVE record is authoritative. Products marked “from the name” were identified from the CNA's free-text names, not a CPE, and are matched less certainly. This product uses the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.

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