CVE-2026-15144@fastify/rate-limit vulnerable to rate-limit bypass via IPv6 address rotation
Updated under an hour ago ()
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No exploitation reported and no EPSS estimate yet.
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@fastify/rate-limit before 11.2.0 keys rate-limit buckets by the verbatim client IP string returned from request.ip. Because a single IPv6 client can control a large address range (a /64 holds 2^64 distinct addresses) and the same address has multiple valid textual representations, an IPv6 capable client can defeat the rate-limit boundary by rotating addresses or by rewriting the same address in different forms. Applications that use @fastify/rate-limit to protect endpoints such as authentication, password reset, OTP delivery, or expensive API calls can be bypassed by IPv6 clients behind a proxy that surfaces IPv6 to the origin when trustProxy is enabled. The issue is fixed in @fastify/rate-limit 11.2.0, where the default key generator normalizes IPv6 addresses to their canonical form, collapses IPv4 mapped IPv6 to IPv4, and applies a configurable prefix mask (default /64) via a new ipv6Subnet option.
- CVSS
- 7.3 HIGH (v3.1, CNA)CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
- Weakness (CWE)
- CWE-307, CWE-770
- Known exploited
- Not in CISA's KEV catalog
- EPSS (exploitation in the next 30 days)
- Not loaded for this CVE
- Assigned by
- openjs
- NVD analysis
- Analyzed
- Record last updated
- Jul 29, 2026
- First seen by InfoSec Signals
- Oct 9, 2026
The CVE record on cve.org NVD's entry
The CVE record is authoritative. Products marked “from the name” were identified from the CNA's free-text names, not a CPE, and are matched less certainly. This product uses the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.