In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: SMP: force responder MITM requirements before building the pairing response
smp_cmd_pairing_req() currently builds the pairing response from the
initiator auth_req before enforcing the local BT_SECURITY_HIGH
requirement. If the initiator omits SMP_AUTH_MITM, the response can
also omit it even though the local side still requires MITM.
tk_request() then sees an auth value without SMP_AUTH_MITM and may
select JUST_CFM, making method selection inconsistent with the pairing
policy the responder already enforces.
When the local side requires HIGH security, first verify that MITM can
be achieved from the IO capabilities and then force SMP_AUTH_MITM in the
response in both rsp.auth_req and auth. This keeps the responder auth bits
and later method selection aligned.
CVSS
8.8 HIGH (v3.1, CNA)CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
from 2b64d153a0cc9d2b60e47be013cde8490f16e0a5 before 425a22c5373d4e1b46492ab869074ebeeade61f3; from 2b64d153a0cc9d2b60e47be013cde8490f16e0a5 before 7ab69426e7ecbd18a222ee2ec87ca612d30197d7; 2b64d153a0cc9d2b60e47be013cde8490f16e0a5 builds before 01bb4045d2306c266178f49ce0c3576d237a3040; from 2b64d153a0cc9d2b60e47be013cde8490f16e0a5 before 91649c02c1baaa18cedf7fb425fa1f0f852c8183; from 2b64d153a0cc9d2b60e47be013cde8490f16e0a5 before c8ff0ca6508535bccabd81c5c9dcc63de8a3d4fb; from 2b64d153a0cc9d2b60e47be013cde8490f16e0a5 before fa14e0e19820b1bbdb42185c9c4efa950bcffef9; from 2b64d153a0cc9d2b60e47be013cde8490f16e0a5 before ec17efb1ef91506cfd17a77692eaf4bbacb520ea; from 2b64d153a0cc9d2b60e47be013cde8490f16e0a5 before d05111bfe37bfd8bd4d2dfe6675d6bdeef43f7c7
from 3.3 before 5.10.253; from 5.11 before 5.15.203; from 5.16 before 6.1.168; from 6.2 before 6.6.134; from 6.7 before 6.12.81; from 6.13 before 6.18.22; from 6.19 before 6.19.12; 7.0; and 5 more ranges
The CVE record is authoritative. Products marked “from the name” were identified from the CNA's free-text names, not a CPE, and are matched less certainly. This product uses the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
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