CVE-2026-44000vm2: sandbox boundary bypass via host Promise resolution preserving host object identity
Updated under an hour ago ()
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vm2 is an open source vm/sandbox for Node.js. Prior to 3.11.0, a sandbox boundary violation in vm2 allows host object identity to cross into the sandbox through host Promise resolution. When a host-side Promise that resolves to a host object is exposed to the sandbox, the value delivered to the sandbox .then() callback preserves host identity. This allows the sandbox to interact with the host object directly, including performing identity checks using host-side WeakMap and mutating host object state from inside the sandbox. This behavior occurs because the Promise fulfillment wrapper uses ensureThis() instead of the stronger cross-realm conversion path (from() / proxy wrapping). If no prototype mapping is found, ensureThis() returns the original object. As a result, objects resolved by host Promises can cross the sandbox boundary without proper isolation. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.11.0.
- CVSS
- 6.5 MEDIUM (v3.1, CNA)CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
- Weakness (CWE)
- CWE-693
- Known exploited
- Not in CISA's KEV catalog
- EPSS (exploitation in the next 30 days)
- Not loaded for this CVE
- Assigned by
- GitHub_M
- NVD analysis
- Analyzed
- Record last updated
- May 13, 2026
- First seen by InfoSec Signals
- Oct 9, 2026
The CVE record on cve.org NVD's entry
The CVE record is authoritative. Products marked “from the name” were identified from the CNA's free-text names, not a CPE, and are matched less certainly. This product uses the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.