CVE-2026-48819Hey API: `buildClientParams` template: prototype chain substitution via unknown `$<slot>___proto__` key
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No exploitation reported and no EPSS estimate yet.
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Hey API is an ecosystem for turning API specifications into production-ready code. Prior to 0.97.3, dist/clients/core/params.ts ships a runtime template copied into generated SDKs as params.gen.ts, and buildClientParams writes unknown slot-prefixed keys such as $body_, $headers_, $path_, and $query_ directly to the corresponding slot, allowing $query___proto__ alongside a legitimate q field to set params.query through params["query"]["__proto__"] = value, call Object.setPrototypeOf(params.query, value), and expose inherited attacker-controlled keys during for..in iteration. This issue is fixed in version 0.97.3.
- CVSS
- 4.8 MEDIUM (v3.1, CNA)CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
- Weakness (CWE)
- CWE-1321
- Known exploited
- Not in CISA's KEV catalog
- EPSS (exploitation in the next 30 days)
- Not loaded for this CVE
- Assigned by
- GitHub_M
- NVD analysis
- Deferred
- Record last updated
- Jul 20, 2026
- First seen by InfoSec Signals
- Oct 9, 2026
The CVE record on cve.org NVD's entry
The CVE record is authoritative. Products marked “from the name” were identified from the CNA's free-text names, not a CPE, and are matched less certainly. This product uses the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.