CVE-2026-56673ComfyUI: Path traversal in LoadImage via the /prompt API allows arbitrary file existence probing and image exfiltration
Updated under an hour ago ()
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It affects Comfy-Org ComfyUI. Add what you run to find out whether that includes you.
No exploitation reported and no EPSS estimate yet.
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ComfyUI is a modular diffusion model GUI, API, and backend with a graph-and-node interface. Prior to 0.28.0, folder_paths.get_annotated_filepath and exists_annotated_filepath join workflow-controlled annotated filenames to a base directory without a containment check, allowing an unauthenticated crafted POST /prompt workflow using LoadImage or sibling nodes to probe arbitrary host paths and exfiltrate image-format files through /view. LoadImage defines a VALIDATE_INPUTS method, which causes the execution engine to skip COMBO (input-directory) validation. Affected nodes include LoadImage, LoadImageMask, LoadImageOutput, LoadAudio, LoadLatent, LoadVideo, and Load3D. This issue is fixed in version 0.28.0.
- CVSS
- 7.5 HIGH (v3.1, CNA)CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
- Weakness (CWE)
- CWE-22
- Known exploited
- Not in CISA's KEV catalog
- EPSS (exploitation in the next 30 days)
- Not loaded for this CVE
- Assigned by
- GitHub_M
- NVD analysis
- Awaiting Analysis
- Record last updated
- Jul 31, 2026
- First seen by InfoSec Signals
- Oct 9, 2026
The CVE record on cve.org NVD's entry
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