CVE-2026-57144PraisonAI SandlockSandbox falls back to unrestricted subprocess execution when Landlock is unavailable
Updated under an hour ago ()
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It affects MervinPraison PraisonAI. Add what you run to find out whether that includes you.
EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0.12%, higher than 2% of scored CVEs.
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PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. From version 4.5.110 to before version 4.6.61, praisonai.sandbox.SandlockSandbox is documented and implemented as the kernel-enforced sandbox backend for untrusted code. Its SandboxConfig.native() path lets callers configure allowed filesystem paths and network=False. On systems where the optional sandlock module imports but reports that Landlock is unavailable, SandlockSandbox.execute() and run_command() do not fail closed. They silently fall back to SubprocessSandbox(self.config). That fallback keeps the same high-level native policy object but does not enforce the native filesystem or network boundary during code execution. A sandboxed payload can read files outside the configured allowed path and open network connections despite network=False. This issue has been patched in version 4.6.61.
- CVSS
- 8.8 HIGH (v3.1, CNA)CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
- Weakness (CWE)
- CWE-266, CWE-668, CWE-693
- Known exploited
- Not in CISA's KEV catalog
- EPSS (exploitation in the next 30 days)
- 0.12% (percentile 2)
- Assigned by
- GitHub_M
- NVD analysis
- Deferred
- Record last updated
- Oct 23, 2026
- First seen by InfoSec Signals
- Oct 23, 2026
The CVE record on cve.org NVD's entry
The CVE record is authoritative. Products marked “from the name” were identified from the CNA's free-text names, not a CPE, and are matched less certainly. This product uses the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.