In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: iforce - validate input packet lengths
iforce_process_packet() reads fixed fields from joystick, wheel and
status packets without first checking their lengths. In particular, the
shared hats-and-buttons helper unconditionally reads data[6]. The status
tail is a sequence of 16-bit effect addresses, but an incomplete final
address is also consumed. A successful zero-length USB URB additionally
reads the packet ID before the common parser is called.
Reject the zero-length USB transfer, require the seven-byte joystick and
wheel prefixes and the two-byte status prefix, and consume only complete
status-tail addresses.
1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 builds before 0ec411167655ef3ff3e84f6af685e962aff9a75b; from 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 before 609be40988898a4d75225ade0ea5c1734757dd33; from 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 before e73d7a7d913d89141321f5f3f16343ecc200d152; from 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 before 5232529eaf57f08fe37484e301579a1915b93d14; from 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 before 2c083ab16e33fbff3ab8c752fbf8118ed3dd31ce; from 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 before a64a8b6b31cd669f0449138e53cc2592d454ccf1; from 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 before 84e5cb517f445dadbd5f8bf4ec513540e51f9c36; from 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 before 5751c781d3c97ab6ce0e2a966156ed882152c415
The CVE record is authoritative. Products marked “from the name” were identified from the CNA's free-text names, not a CPE, and are matched less certainly. This product uses the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
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