CVE-2026-83813Twisted: DNS Response Spoofing in twisted.names Due to Missing Source Address Validation
Updated under an hour ago ()
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No exploitation reported and no EPSS estimate yet.
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Twisted is an event-based framework for internet applications, supporting Python 3.6+. Prior to 26.10.0rc1, twisted.names.dns.DNSDatagramProtocol accepts a UDP DNS response for a pending query when its 16-bit transaction ID matches but does not verify that the response came from the queried host and port. An attacker able to deliver a packet to the resolver's listening port with the correct transaction ID can inject a forged answer. The standard twisted.names.client.Resolver uses a new random source port for each query, increasing off-path attack complexity, while applications that reuse a DNSDatagramProtocol instance expose only the transaction-ID search space after the first query. A successful forgery can redirect hostname resolution and enable mail interception, server-side request forgery, or man-in-the-middle positioning. This issue is fixed in version 26.10.0rc1.
- CVSS
- 3.1 LOW (v3.1, CNA)CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
- Weakness (CWE)
- CWE-346
- Known exploited
- Not in CISA's KEV catalog
- EPSS (exploitation in the next 30 days)
- Not loaded for this CVE
- Assigned by
- GitHub_M
- NVD analysis
- Awaiting Analysis
- Record last updated
- Oct 23, 2026
- First seen by InfoSec Signals
- Oct 23, 2026
The CVE record on cve.org NVD's entry
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